Dynamic Tariffs with Asymmetric Information by Reizman, Raymond G.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
DYNAMIC TARIFFS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Raymond G. Riezman
California Institute of Technology 
University of Iowa 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 720
February 1990
DYNAMIC TARIFFS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Raymond G. Riezman 
California Institute of Technology 
University of Iowa 
ABSTRACT 
Recent work in game theory has demonstrated how cooperative outcomes can 
be sustained when the game is played repeatedly, defectors are punished, but 
agents play non-cooperatively. This methodology is applied here to determine 
when two countries can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade 
policies non-cooperatively. 
We focus on the role of asynunetric information. Countries have private 
information about the extent of their own protection, but the overall level of 
protection can be thought of as private information. Therefore, any agreement 
to eliminate or reduce tariffs is limited by the fact that countries can cheat 
on the agreement by using non-observable forms of protection. 
Using import trigger strategies, cooperation (in the form of low 
tariffs) can be supported. There a.re periodic reversionary (high tariff)
episodes which necessarily occur. They are not the result of mistakes, 
attempted manipulation, or misperception. Neither country cheats on the low 
tariff agreement, but reversions to high tariffs are triggered by the random 
variable. 
In section V we examine a slightly different trigger strategy. 
Countries' strategies are based on their observations of the terms of trade. 
This alteration changes the results and in this case cooperation does not 
occur. 
I. Introduction 
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Recent developments in the theory of repeated games has been applied to 
try to better understand protection of international trade. This paper's 
contribution is to view protection as the outcome of a repeated game in which 
countries cannot perfectly observe other countries protection policies. 1 The 
main purpose is to argue that the lack of perfect information about protection 
policies is central to understanding protection of iriternational trade. 
The notion that protection is not perfectly observable can be justified 
on factual and theoretical grounds. Current U. S. trade legislation includes a 
new provision called Trade Liberalization Priorities (Super 301) which revises 
section 301 of the 1974 trade bill. This new provision directs the U. S. Trade 
Representative to identify trade practices and countries which hinder U.S. 
exports the most. These priority countries would then face retaliation from the 
U. S. if a negotiated agreement to reduce these barriers to U. S. exports could 
• I thank Pat Conway, Russell Cooper, Avinash Dixit, James Friedman, Howard
Gruenspecht, John Kennan, Ramon Marimon, Doug McManus, Roger Myerson, Rob Porter, 
Jennifer Reinganum, participants at the Mid-West International Economics Group 
meetings, the University of Western Ontario, and two anonymous referees for 
helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 An early version of the dynamic problem by Jensen and Thursby (1980) uses
the idea of approximate equilibria, a paper by Mayer (1981) focuses on different 
negotiation schemes to reduce tariffs, Enders (1986) examines different 
punishment schemes, Dixit (1987) determines when cooperation breaks down, Bagwell 
and Staiger (1988) have a model in which the level of protection depends on the 
volume of trade, Ludema (1989) determines optimal trade agreements. All of these 
papers assume that protection is observable. Copeland (1989) does consider 
imperfect observability of protection. 
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not be reached. Thus, it is not clear a priori, which countries or practices 
this applies to, and the provision for retaliatory action suggests that the 
offending countries and the USTR may not agree on what constitutes unfair trade 
practices. 
A provision which failed to be included in the current trade bill took a 
more direct approach to the same problem. This amendment which has become known 
as the Gephardt Bill, proposes punishing Japan.with higher U. S. tariffs if the 
bilateral trade deficit is above some predetermined level. The rationale behind 
this bill is that the Japan-U. S. trade deficit is due to hidden protection by 
the Japanese. The Gephardt Bill is a trigger strategy in which the punishment 
is higher U. S. tariffs which are triggered by certain realizations of the Japan­
U. S. trade deficit. This threat of punishment would discourage Japan from using 
hidden protection to the extent this protection affects the trade deficit. 
This proposed legislation generated a great deal of public discussion 
during which it became apparent that there is great disagreement over how much 
Japan actually protects its imports. Japanese tariffs are not especially high 
and have been substantially reduced in recent years. Yet many feel that Japan 
effectively keeps out U. S. imports with a variety of non-tariff trade barriers. 
Opponents of the Gephardt Bill argue that no such hidden protection exists and 
that the U. S. trade deficit is due to the inability of U. S. industries to compete 
with the Japanese. This debate suggests that U. S. policymakers do not know how 
much Japan protects imports, and it raises the question of how policy should be 
conducted in light of this fact. 
Another example of how protection involves asymmetric information is the 
recent EEC ban of beef imports from the U. S. The Europeans claim that U. S. beef 
producers are using dangerous hormones and that the meat is unsafe. U. S. beef 
producers say that this is simply disguised protection. Who is correct? 
Practically speaking, we do not know and have no way of knowing what the European 
motivations for this policy are, and hence do not know whether the ban represents 
legitimate domestic policy which protects the health and safety of EEC citizens 
or whether it is disguised protectionism. 
Theory suggests that it may be difficult to know the extent of foreign 
protection. For example, in simple models a 10% tariff can be replicated by a 
10% consumption tax along with a 10% production subsidy. In more complicated 
3 
models it may be difficult to exactly replicate the effects of tariffs with 
domestic policies, but one can always use domestic policies to manipulate 
international trade. Therefore, any agreement to eliminate or reduce tariffs 
is limited by the fact that countries can cheat on the agreement by using 
domestic policies or other forms of protection not covered by the agreement. 
Ray and Marvel (1984) have shown that following the Kennedy round of tariff 
reductions, U. S. industries were able to replace tariffs that had been negotiated 
away with other forms of protection. 
The theory of political economy explains non-tariff forms of protection 
by arguing that politicians use them in order to disguise protection from the 
voters. Then, inadvertently, political considerations might work to make 
protection less observable to foreigners. Thus, the facts and the theory suggest 
that viewing protection as not observable to foreigners is appropriate. 
The basic model we use comes from Dixit (1987). He develops the standard 
prisoner's dilemma tariff model and shows that in an infinitely repeated game, 
cooperation (free trade) can be attained for some period of time provided that 
the gains frc>m t:al'.'iffs "re not too large and th1lt the discount factor is not too 
small. We extend his model in two directions. We add uncertainty in the 
underlying model and non-observability of protection. 
We use recent work in game theory which has demonstrated how cooperative 
outcomes can be sustained when the game is played repeatedly, defectors are 
punished, but agents play non-cooperatively. Recent papers examine how a group 
of firms, acting non-cooperatively, can produce the monopoly level of output when 
they can observe other firms output levels (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)) and 
when they cannot observe other firms output levels (Green and Porter (1984), 
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986)). 
We use the Green and Porter methodology to determine when two countries 
can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade policies non-
cooperatively. The Green and Porter trigger strategies are simple, have a 
straightforward economic interpretation in our problem, and seem to correspond 
to practical policy measures (such as Super 301 or the Gephardt Bill). 2
2Recent work by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1987) and Fudenberg and 
Maskin (1986) examine more general prisoner's dilemma games. Their results 
suggest that the Green-Porter strategies may not be optimal. A direction for 
future research is to characterize optimal protection policies when protection 
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In section III we analyze the effect of adding uncertainty when protection 
is perfectly observable. This model works much like Dixit's except that certain 
realizations of the random variable can trigger tariff wars. Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1986) take a different approach by focusing on how much cooperation can 
be sustained under varying demand conditions. 
Protection is not observable in section IV. Here, using import trigger 
strategies, cooperation (in the form of low tariffs) can be supported. As in 
Green and Porter (1984) there are periodic reversionary (high tariff) episodes 
which necessarily occur. They are not the result of mistakes, attempted 
manipulation, or misperception. Neither country cheats on the low tariff 
agreement, but reversions to high tariffs are triggered by the random variable. 
In spite of this, countries go along with the reversionary episodes because they 
realize that high tariff periods are necessary to provide each country with the 
correct incentives to sustain the low tariff episodes. In addition, the high 
tariff equilibria are short-run Nash equilibria. The extent and duration of 
cooperation depends on the form of the trigger strategy and the actual parameter 
values. Thus, it is not clear whether free trade is a poss_ibility, nor is it 
clear whether cooperative periods or reversionary periods are more prevalent. 
In section V we examine a slightly different trigger strategy. Countries' 
strategies are based on their observations of the terms of trade. This 
alteration changes the results and in this case cooperation does not occur. This 
result is in sharp contrast to section IV and to the results of Green and Porter 
(1984) who find that in the case of an oligopoly, cooperation can be attained 
for periods of time. However, our result does indicate a major difference 
between the tariff problem and the oligopoly problem. In the oligopoly problem 
firms try to cheat in the same direction, namely, they all want to produce a 
little more, selling it at the monopoly price. This pushes the price down no 
matter which firm does it. When the price falls below a certain level a 
reversion to Cournot outputs and prices is triggered. Symmetric punishments 
make sense since there is no way to determine (even ex post) which firm cheated. 
In the tariff problem, the countries are trying to push the terms of trade in 
opposite directions, hence the reversion to Nash tariffs occurs if the terms of 
is not observable. 
5 
trade are too high or too low. It turns out that a country gets punished when 
it could not have been cheating and in this case, symmetric punishments do not 
induce cooperation. 
These results show that whether protection is observable or not matters. 
When protection cannot be observed, as in Section IV, some cooperation can be 
achieved, but it may be quite limited. In particular, free trade might not be 
a possibility. Reversions to high tariffs occur, but for different reasons than 
when tariffs are observable. In the observable case, reversions occur because 
a realization of the random variable makes cheating worthwhile. In the model 
with non-observable protection countries never cheat, but reversions occur 
because the observable variable is pushed below some predetermined level by a 
realization of the random variable. Also, as section V makes clear, the choice 
of the mechanism used to induce cooperation is crucial. If the 11wrong11 trigger 
strategy is chosen then no cooperation will be achieved. 
II. Model
The basic model employed is from Dixit (1987). There are two countries, 
home and foreign (foreign country variables are denoted by*) and two competitive 
industries producing goods x and y. The home country imports x, the foreign 
country imports y and countries can levy positive or negative tariffs, (rir*) on
imports. There are four prices Px, Py, Px*, and Py• , and they are related by the
following 
• Px - Px (1 + T) p/ - Py (1 + T*).
Define � - Px*/py, the international relative price or terms of trade. Notice 
that the home country prefers lower values of �. and the foreign country likes 
higher values. We ignore all intra-country income distribution issues. The 
justification for this is based on optimal taxation considerations. Since 
tariffs are far down the list of desirable policies to accomplish any 
redistribution of income, there is no a priori reason to think that income 
redistribution considerations will be important in the determination of tariffs. 
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Each country has a social welfare function, U(rr, T) 
give rise to import demand functions M(rr, T) and M*(rr, T*).
when the balance of payments is zero, 3
1f M(1f, T) 
and U*(rr, T*). These 
Equilibrium occurs 
This determines a function �(T, r*) which we assume to be continuous and
differentiable. 
We now adopt the view that countries select tariff policies that maximize 
expected social welfare over an infinite horizon, and hence view the tariff game 
as an infinitely repeated game. Uncertainty arises because of shocks to 
preferences or endowments, and is manifested by the fact that home imports have 
a random component. We assume 
where Bt is i. i. d. with c. d. f. F and continuous density f�, E(Bt) 1.
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Substituting this expression for imports into the balance of payments condition 
�t • Mt, and Mt
* can be written as functions of Tt,Tt*, and 9t.
Social welfare can now be expressed as 
with a similar expression for the foreign country. The problem facing the home 
country is 
(1) 
where r 
max 
T t-0 
(T0, T1, T2, . . .  ) and Eis the discount factor. 
3An interesting extension would be to allow for trade imbalances. This will
introduce an additional set of intertemporal considerations (see Marimon (1988)). 
4Different assumptions about the timing and observability of Bt will be made
in different sections of the paper. 
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Assume that the Marshall-Lerner conditions hold and that all tariff 
revenues are redistributed to consumers, so that raising tariffs improves the 
terms of trade. 
< 0, > 0 ' 
In addition, assume that starting from a zero tariff a country's welfare improves 
when it imposes a small tariff, and one country is always hurt by increases in 
the other country's tariff. 5 As a one-shot game, the tariff game results in a
prisoner's dilemma in which charging tariffs is a Nash equilibrium, yet there 
are gains available if free trade can be attained.6
Our approach to cooperation is to assume that countries do not formally 
cooperate, but adopt strategies that can lead to cooperation over time (see 
Friedman (1971)). Such mechanisms involve strategies in which defectors from 
the cooperative equilibrium are punished. However, the punishments must be 
credible in the sense that if defection does occur the other country will 
actually carry out the punishment; that is, the game must be subgame perfect. 
One convenient way to do this is to make the punishment be a finite reversion 
to the one-period equilibrium strategies (see for example, Green and Porter). 
In our model this would mean that the punishment would involve countries 
adopting the one-shot Nash equilibrium tariffs for some fixed number of periods. 7 
We will analyze two different models: one in which the random shock and tariffs 
are observable and one in which they are not. 
50nce autarky is reached this last statement has to be modified because
further increases in tariffs have no effect. 
6In what follows we ignore one potential Nash equilibrium, autarky. As
discussed in Enders (1986) this is a weak equilibrium. 
7These are not necessarily jointly optimal strategies in the sense that
harsher punishments might be better because they would induce longer periods of 
cooperation or a greater degree of cooperation. 
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III. Observable Tariffs
In this section all tariffs and random variables are observable. We assume 
that both countries adopt trigger strategies (see Friedman (1971)) which require 
free trade if free trade occurred in the previous period. 8 Any defection from
free trade is punished by a reversion to Nash equilibrium tariffs. In this 
section, for analytical convenience, we assume- that the Nash reversion is 
infinite. More generally, one could consider finite reversions (which we do 
later), and other choices for the reversion equilibrium (autarky for example) 
to determine optimal punishments. 
The timing critically affects the results. Suppose tariffs are chosen 
simultaneously, then 8 is revealed. Free trade is sustained as long as it never
pays a country to defect. That is, if the one period gain from defection is less 
than the discounted stream of losses from having Nash tariffs forever, then free 
trade is chosen. At time T the home country will choose free trade if (2) holds 
(2) 
<O 
E (W(T0, 0, 0T) - W(0, 0, 0T)) < 2: r,t
B t-T+l 
E (W(O, 0, Bt.) �· W(h, h*, Bt)) 
B 
where r0 is the standard optimal tariff and h, h* are the one-shot Nash tariffs.
The left hand side gives the one period expected gain to cheating by charging 
the optimal tariff. The right hand side gives the expected discounted losses 
that occur because from the next period on high tariffs will be charged by both 
countries instead of free trade. If the LHS is smaller than the RHS then there 
is no incentive for the home country to cheat on a free trade agreement. A 
similar condition exists for the foreign country. This condition is essentially 
the same as Dixit's. Free trade can be sustained by tacit cooperation provided 
J?, is not too small. 
Different timing changes the results. Suppose that B is revealed first,
followed by the simultaneous choice of tariffs. The left hand side of (2) 
changes because the value of B is known when tariffs are chosen. The condition
for free trade to be sustained becomes 
8We rule out state contingent tariff agreements.
(3) 
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< L: J?,t 
t-T+l 
E (W(O, O, Bt) - W(h, h0, Bt))
e 
Interpreting 8 as a temporary shock any realization of 8 affects only the LHS 
of (3). Realizations of 8 that make the LHS of (3) larger increase the 
likelihood that tariff reversions are triggered. For example, values of e that 
make the foreign offer curve very inelastic would increase the gains from the 
optimal tariff and hence increase the likelihood of high tariff episodes. 
This framework can be used to develop testable models of tariff wars. 
Specifying particular motivations for protection will yield specific versions 
of inequality (3). For example, one could suppose welfare depended on 
employment, or the terms of trade, or one could formulate a political economy 
version in which the function W is an outcome of a political process (see 
Feenstra and Lewis (1987) ). Then, differentiating with respect to e gives
predictions about what triggers reversions to high tariffs. This hypothesis can 
then be tested by examining periods of high and low levels of protection. 
IV. Non-observable Tariffs-Import Trigger Strategy
In this section we assume that countries cannot observe the tariffs of 
other countries, nor can they observe the random variable e .  The motivation for 
this is that since tariffs can be replaced exactly by the correct combination 
of domestic policies (an equal percentage production subsidy and consumption tax 
or appropriate behavior on the part of a state trading agency) protection is in 
a real sense not observable. To some extent the current dispute with Japan over 
the U. S. trade deficit is an example of this phenomenon. Much of the debate 
concerns the extent of actual Japanese protection with the Japanese pointing to 
their relatively modest tariffs and the U. S. claiming that the local Japanese 
price of goods imported from the U. S. are much higher than they should be based 
on these tariff rates. 
One way to interpret what follows is that there are observable and non­
observable forms of protection. Assume that the observable tariffs are zero, 
for example because of international treaties, so that only non-observable 
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protection can be used. For analytical convenience we will assume that non· 
observable protection takes the form of tariffs. 9
We use the model developed in section II, except that countries now observe 
only �t• Mt (and therefore, Mt*) and their own tariff, with the other country's
past and current tariffs and past and current et not observable. Countries use 
the same type of strategy as before, but since they do not know directly what 
tariff the other country is charging their strategies have to be conditioned on 
observables. This problem is similar to the one solved by Green and Porter for 
an oligopoly. What follows draws heavily from their model. 
Countries have trigger strategies s and s* defined by
• • 
So = To ' s 0 = T 0.
• s 
r0 and r*0 can be any given initial tariffs. The strategy at time t depends only 
on the history of home imports up to time t-110
(4) 
- -* A Nash equilibrium is a pair s, s for which 
"' 
U(st(
M
o·· . .  ,
M
t-l)'�t)} E -*
{ 
:E J?,t 
s, s t-0 
{ 
"' 
U(st(
M
o·· . .  ,
M
t-l)'�t)} < E - -* :E J?,
t 
s, s t-0 
9we assume that tariffs are not observable throughout. This would be 
appropriate, for example, if the non-observable protection is equal percentage 
production subsidies and consumption taxes. Less efficient methods of protection 
may have to be used but the qualitative results will be unaffected by this. 
10strategies do not depend on past values of tariffs and et, except to the
extent that these variables influence Mt. 
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for all possible strategies s, with a similar condition for the foreign country. 
An equilibrium occurs when both countries' strategies maximize discounted 
expected utility, taking the other country's strategy as given. This is the 
usual definition of Nash equilibrium, except that the strategies are trigger 
strategies. In this model, both countries realize that they are in a prisoner's 
dilemma game. They would prefer the low tariff outcome (free trade if possible) 
and will set low tariffs provided that the other country is also setting low 
tariffs. However, the other country's tariffs cannot be directly observed, nor, 
since there is uncertainty, can they be inferred by observing imports or the 
terms of trade. 
What is done is to adopt a trigger strategy which requires them to keep 
tariffs low unless there is evidence that someone is cheating on the low tariff 
agreement. Both countries can observe the home country's imports. 11 If either
country charges higher tariffs than the low tariff agreement rates, home imports 
will fall. If home imports fall below some predetermined critical level then 
high (one-shot Nash) tariffs are used for a specified period of time. Thus, 
cheating can be detected, probabilistically, by observing home imports. In this 
way cheaters are deterred since if the cheating is detected, there will be high 
tariffs for some finite period of time. The punishment will actually be carried 
out, because the high tariffs are equilibrium tariffs in the one-shot game. 
More formally, call the set of low tariffs (.l., .l.*) and the high tariffs
(h, h*). The low tariffs are endogenously determined and the high tariffs are the 
one-shot Nash tariffs. Countries choose the level of home imports M: that 
triggers reversion, and the length of the reversionary period T. We also require 
that at the low tariff equilibrium a small change in either tariff reduces home 
imports: 8M(.l., J..*)/8A and 8M(.l., J..*)/8.l.* are negative . 12 Equilibrium requires that 
the trigger imports and length of the reversionary period be the same for both 
countries. Period t is normal if 
11Presumably both countries can observe the foreign country's imports and 
therefore, the terms of trade. The analysis would be the same if the punishment 
were triggered on the foreign country's imports. 
12A sufficient condition for this is that both offer curves are elastic at 
the low tariff equilibrium. 
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t =0, or 
t-1 normal and Mt > M 
t-T normal and Mt-T < M 
Otherwise t is reversionary. We now can determine the tariff at any time t 
{ � 
t normal
t reversionary 
{
t normal 
t reversionary 
Thus, (,\, ,\*, h, h*, T, M) characterize an equilibrium. The plan of attack
is to choose arbitrary T and M , and use the one-shot Nash tariffs for h and h*
and solve for the ,\ and ,\* that will occur in normal periods. Clearly, the
choice of T and M will affect the actual values of ,\ and ,\*, but our goal here 
is to characterize the equilibrium and show how cooperative trade agreements can 
be sustained by repetition even when protection is not observable. 
Define 
with a similar definition for the foreign country. Let V(r) (V*(r*)) be
discounted expected utility when 't 
V(r) 
A * 
V(r,,\ ) , 
* * 
V (r ) 
r (Tt• 
- r*) in normal periods, that is
'* * 
V (,\, r ) 
Let �(r) be the one-period expected utility of setting the tariff equal 
to r given that the foreign country sets its tariff low, 
')'(r) - E W(r,>.*, et) and
et 
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1'• (r*)
Expected utility in reversionary periods is S and s*
and 
We assume that 1'(>.) > S and 
s* 
r* 0 ' that is, expected utility is
higher with low tariffs than high tariffs for both countries. This assumption 
is restrictive since it assumes that no country can do better with Nash tariffs 
than at the low tariff equilibrium. As shown in Kennan and Riezman (1988) 
countries with a big enough size advantage might benefit from high tariffs. 
(5) 
(6) 
V and v* satisfy the equations
V(r) 
- - -- --------- -- -- -- - ------- *- -
')'(r) + E. Pr(OtM(r, >. ) > 11) V(i) 
* 
+ (1 - Pr(OtM(r,>. ) 
A T-1 
> M)][ � 
t-1 
* * * * * 
V (r ) - 1' (r ) + E. Pr(OtM(>.,r ) > M) 
* * 
V (r ) 
* A T-1 
+ (1 - Pr(OtM(>.,r ) > M)][ � t-1 
t * T * * E. S + E. V (r ) ]
For each country the probability of no reversion, given that the other 
country charges low tariffs, is a function of its tariff, 
(7) 
* 
Pr(OtM(r,>. ) > M) 
* 
Pr(OtM(>.,r ) > M) 
Then (5) becomes 
1 
- 1 
* 
F(M/ M(r,>. )) = 1-b 
* 
F(M/ M(>., r )) 
* 
5 1-b 
(8) V(r)(l - £(1-b) - b£T) 
14 
T-1 
�(r) + b � £t o 
t-1 
With some straightforward algebraic manipulation this becomes 
V(r) �(r) +
1 - £ + 
This in turn simplifies to 
(9) V(r) - �(r) - o + 
1 
The interpretation of (9) is that the home country's expected utility of tariff 
rate r i.s t:li.e gain from t:li.e low t:ar:i.:H agreement: plus the utility with high 
tariffs, appropriately discounted. The corresponding expression for the foreign 
country is 
(10) 
(11) 
and 
( 12) 
(13) 
(14) 
* * 
V (r ) -
* * 
�(r ) - o 
* T1 - £ + b (£ - £ ) 
+ 
1 - £ 
If (A, A*) is a Nash equilibrium, then given M, h, h•, and T
V(r) < V(A) for all r, 
V(r*) < V(A*) for all r•
The first order conditions are 
V' (A) - 0 
v*'(A*) - 0.
Using (7), (9) and (10), (13) becomes
(15) 
15 
T A * 
[l - S + (S - S )(F(M/M(A, A )) �'(A)
T " * * "' * 2 + (�(A) - 5)(£ - S )f(M/M(A, A ))(8M(A, A)/8A)(M/M(A, A ) ) 0
and for the foreign country (14) becomes 
(16) T 
I\ * * 
[l - S + (S - S )(F(M/M(A, A )) �'(A )
* * * T " * * * " * 2  + (� (A ) - 5 ) (S - S )f(M/M(A, A ))(8M(A, A )/8A )(M/M(A, A ) ) - 0
Equations (15) and (16) give the necessary conditions for equilibrium with 
trigger strategies to exist under the conditions stated above. These equations 
are analogous to the equilibrium conditions in Green and Porter (see their 
equation (6)). The first term is the marginal gain from an increase in the 
tariff given that the other country has low tariffs. For both countries this 
term is positive. The second term gives the marginal loss due to the expected 
change in the probability that a reversionary episode is triggered by this 
increase in tariffs. The components of the second term are all positive except 
for 8M(A, A*)/8A in (15) and 8M(A, A*)/8A* in (16), which are negative since any
increase in tariffs reduces the volume of trade. Thus, no country cheats in 
equilibrium since the expected one period gain from doing so is exactly offset 
by the discounted expected losses which occur because cheating on the low tariff 
agreement increases the probability that reversion to high tariffs occurs. 
However, as in the Green-Porter model, reversions to the punishment phase, 
high tariffs, will be triggered by the random variable. Even though each country 
knows it is not optimal for either country to cheat, it is rational to 
participate in the high tariff phase because countries understand the incentives 
of the dynamic equilibrium which require that the punishment phase actually 
occur. Thus, the empirical prediction of the model is that there will be periods 
of low tariffs and periods of high levels of protection, i.e. , trade wars. In 
this model, these reversions to high tariffs are not some kind of mistake or 
miscalculation; rather they are necessary to sustain the low tariff periods. 
Another interesting feature is that the actual tariff rates observed in the low 
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tariff phase are affected by tariff rates in the one-shot Nash game. Thus, over 
time, if the underlying one-shot Nash game changes so will A and A• . 
There is one aspect of the tariff problem that is different than the 
oligopoly problem. In the oligopoly case, the punishment phase is triggered by 
the price falling below some level. Even ex post there would be no way to 
determine which firm, if any, cheated on the agreement (firm output is only 
observable to the firms themselves). Thus, having all firms share equally in 
the punishment makes sense. The same is not true in the tariff case. Presumably 
the terms of trade are observable. Suppose the punishment is triggered and the 
terms of trade move in favor of the home country. In this case it seems very 
unlikely that the foreign country cheated on the low tariff agreement. Yet, the 
foreign country will be punished, Intuitively, it seems that there is useful 
information available that is not being used to detect cheating. In the next 
section we examine this more closely by changing the model of this section to 
have the punishment triggered by the terms of trade instead of home imports. 
As we will see the results are quite different. 
V. Non-observable Tariffs-terms of trade trigger 
In this section, countries use observations of the terms of trade to detect 
cheating on the low tariff agreement. The model is the same as section IV with 
the following modifications. The strategy at time t depends on the history of 
prices up to time t-1 
(4') 
s (?r ' • . .  '"' ) 
t 0 t-1 
r ' 
t 
* 
s (?r ' • • •  , ?f ) 
t 0 t-1 
- -* A Nash equilibrium is a pair s, s for which 
{
"' 
U(st<"'o· � ···"'t-l)'"'t)} E -* � E, s, s t-0 
*
r 
t 
< E 
- -* f �-lt-U t - � & U(st<"'o• ··· •"'t-l)'"'t) s, s J 
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for all possible strategies s. There is a similar condition for the foreign 
country. 
Countries keep tariffs low if the terms of trade stays within a 
predetermined range. If world prices are outside that range then high (one-shot 
Nash) tariffs are used for a specified period of time. Thus, cheating can be 
detected, probabilistically, by observing prices. In this way cheaters are 
deterred since if the cheating is detected, there will be high tariffs for some 
finite period of time. As before, the punishment will actually be carried out 
because the high tariffs are equilibrium tariffs in the one-shot game. 
As in section IV, call the set of low tariffs (>., >.*) and the high tariffs
(h, h*). Countries choose the price that triggers reversion on the low end,..,,
the high end "h• and the length of the reversionary period T. Equilibrium 
requires that the trigger prices and length of the reversionary period be the 
same for both countries. Period t is normal if 
t =0, or 
t-1 normal and wA < �t < �h, or 
t-T normal and either rrt-T < ''"> or "t-T > "h·
Otherwise t is reversionary. The tariffs at any time t are 
t normal 
t reversionary 
{
t normal 
t reversionary 
Using the same approach as section IV, V and v* satisfy the functional
equations 
(5.) V(r) - �(r) + & Pr(,.., <  Otrr(r, >.*) < "h) V(r)
T-1 
+ [l - Pr(,.., <  Otrr(r,>.*) < rrh)][ :!: &
to+ &T V(r)] 
t-1 
( 6') 
Define 
(7') 
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V*(r*) = ·/(r*) + 1' Pr("" < Bt"(>., r*) < "h) V*(r*)
T-1 
+ [l Pr("" < Bt"(>., r*) < "h)] [ � 1'ts• + 1'T V*(r*)]
Pr("" < Bt"(r, >.*) < "h) 
Pr("" < Bt"(>., r*) < "h)
F(1rh/1r(r, >.*))
F(1rh/"(>., r*)) 
t=l 
F(,,,/,,(r, >.*))
F(,,,/,,(>., r*))
Then (5') becomes exactly the same as equation (8) before. The analysis proceeds 
as in section IV, except (15) and (16) become 
(15') T * * [l 
- 1' + (1' - 1' )(1 - F("h/"(>., >. )) + F(">./"(>., >. ))] �'(>.) 
* r a,,o., >. ) ;a>. 
+ (�(>.) - 6)(1' - 1' ) x 
* 21'(>., >. ) 
* * 
[-f(,,h/"(>.,
>. ))1rh+ f(" /"(>., >. ))1r>.] = 0.
and for the foreign country we have 
(16') 
* * 
+ (� (>. ) 
* * 6*)(1' _ 1' r) _
a
_
,,
_
<
_
>-
_
, 
_
>. 
_
)
_
/
_
a
_
>. 
x 
Equations (15') and (16') give the necessary conditions for equilibrium 
with trigger strategies to exist under the conditions stated above. These 
equations are analogous to the equilibrium conditions (15) and (16). The first 
term is the marginal,gain from an increase in the tariff given that the other 
country has low tariffs. For both countries this term is positive. The second 
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term gives the marginal gain or loss due to the expected change in the 
probability that a reversionary episode is triggered by this increase in tariffs. 
The second term consists of four terms: three are non-negative (by previous 
assumptions), but the third term which has arr(A, A*)/aA in (15') and arr(A, A*)/aA•
in (16') has opposite signs in the two equations. An increase in tariffs has 
opposite effects on the terms of trade. Suppose that arr(A, A*)/aA < 0 and (15')
holds. Then, a�(A, A*)/aA• > 0 and (16') cannot hold. Hence, it is impossible
that both first order conditions (15') and (16') hold simultaneously, and hence 
no trigger strategy equilibrium exists. 13
This result stands in sharp contrast to Green-Porter and to the results 
of section IV. In the Green-Porter model equilibrium exists because firms always 
cheat in the same direction. Cheating means selling more which lowers the price 
which in turn, increases the probability that a reversionary episode is 
triggered. In their model the one period gain from cheating is equated to the 
expected losses due to a higher probability of reversion. In the section V model 
each country's cheating push the relevant price in opposite directions. So, for 
example, if the home country cheats by increasing its non-observable tariff it 
gets the one period gain and increases the probability of a reversion being 
triggered by � being too low. But, reversions are also triggered by � being to 
high, and the home country's cheating reduces the probability that this happens. 
What (15') and (16') taken together show that for one of these countries cheating 
has to lower the probability that reversion occurs. Hence, for one country it 
always pays to cheat, and there can be no low tariff equilibrium. 
Section IV fixes things up by having the reversion triggered when imports 
are too low. This works because any cheating lowers imports (given some 
restrictions on offer curve elasticities. )  Hence, any cheating causes the 
probability of reversion to increase. This suggests that low tariffs could be 
achieved using terms of trade trigger strategies by introducing asymmetric 
punishments so that the home (foreign) country only gets punished when � is too 
low (high). Then any cheating would increase the probability of reversion. 
13The second terms of (15') or (16') could be zero, but if this is the case
no equilibrium exists, since the first term is unambiguously positive. There 
are benefits, but no cost to cheating. 
V. Conclusion 
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We have analyzed dynamic theories of tariffs when there is uncertainty and 
when protection is both observable and not observable. If protection is 
observable free trade can be sustained over time, however, there will be periodic 
reversions to high tariffs. This occurs because certain realizations of the 
random variable make cheating worthwhile. When tariffs are not observable, if 
countries use the correct trigger strategies, some degree of cooperation can be 
sustained. Periodic reversions will occur but for different reasons than in the 
observable case. Reversions occur because a realization of the random variable 
pushes the observable variable below some critical value. Even though no country 
cheats it is still optimal for the reversion to take place. It remains to be 
determined under what circumstances free trade can be maintained, but the general 
conclusion is that there will be periods of high and low protection levels when 
countries use import trigger strategies. The high tariff episodes are necessary 
to provide the right incentives for countries to cooperate some of the time, and 
are not the result of irrationality or miscalculation. 
Interesting extensions would be to analyze the terms of trade trigger 
strategy with asymmetric punishments. In addition, other types of strategies 
can be analyzed. Another important direction for future research is to consider 
finite horizon models. It is important that these results do not depend 
critically on the infinite horizon assumption. A longer range goal is to provide 
more modeling detail to produce a model that can be tested using historical data. 
21 
References 
Abreu, D. , Pearce, D. , and E. Stacchetti, "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with 
Imperfect Monitoring, " Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 1986, 251-
269. 
Abreu, D. , Pearce, D. , and E. Stacchetti, "Toward a Theory of Discounted 
Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring, " mimeo, September, 1987. 
Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger, 11A Theory of Managed Trade, 11 mimeo, September, 
1988. 
Copeland, B. , "Theory of Trade Wars, " mimeo, 1989. 
Dixit, A. , "Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy," in Advances in Economic 
Theory: Fifth World Congress, Truman F. Bewley, editor, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1987, 329-362. 
Enders, A. , "Strategic Aspects of Low-Tariff Agreements, " mimeo, October, 
1986. 
Feenstra, R. and T. Lewis, nNegotiated Trade Restrictions with Private 
Political Pressure;" University of Galiforriia'Davis Workirig Paper
No. 290, April, 1987. 
Friedman, J. , 11A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergarnes, " Review of 
Economic Studies, 28, 1971, 1-12. 
Fudenberg, D. , and E. Maskin, "Discounted Repeated Games with Unobservable 
Actions, I: One-Sided Moral Hazard, " Harvard Discussion Paper No. 
1280, October, 1986. 
Green, E. and R. Porter, "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price 
Information," Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 1, January, 1984, 87-100. 
Jensen, R. and M. Thursby, "Free Trade: Two Non-cooperative Equilibrium 
Approaches," Ohio State University Working Paper #58, September, 
1980. 
Kennan, J. and R. Riezman, "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?" International 
Economic Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, February, 1988, 81-85. 
Ludema, R. , "Optimal Trade Agreements between Sovereign Nations, 11 mimeo, 
March, 1989. 
Marimon, R. , "Wealth Accumulation with Moral Hazard," mimeo, Hoover 
Institution, 1988. 
Mayer, W. , "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," 
22 
Oxford Economic Papers, 33, 135-153, 1981. 
Ray, E. and H. Marvel, "The Pattern of Protection in the Industrialized 
World, "Review of Economics and Statistics, 66, August, 1984, 452-
458. 
Riezman, R. , 11Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint, 11 Southern 
Economic Journal, 48, January, 1982, 583-593. 
Rotemberg, J. and G. Saloner, "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars 
During Booms, " American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 3, June, 
1986, 390-407. 
